-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [AISWorld] Reconsidering Theories in IS Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2018 15:58:30 +0000 From: Siponen, Mikko mikko.t.siponen@jyu.fi To: aisworld@lists.aisnet.org aisworld@lists.aisnet.org
Reconsidering Theories in IS
A seminar for doctoral students and faculty
Friday November 2nd, 2018.
Perhaps it is not too much of an overstatement to say that the expectation in top IS journals today is that every single paper develops a new theory or modifies existing theory. In this course, we explain how many influential and seminal IS accounts on scientific theory profoundly obscure what is a scientific theory in contemporary science. Moreover, generally speaking, the IS discussion on “theory” misses the fact that the main vehicle of scientific knowledge in the contemporary sciences are not theories.
We note how many IS theory authors, like organizational and management research (OMR) authors or some influential sociologists (e.g., Robert Merton and Robert Dubin), were misled by professional philosophers. These were namely, logical empiricist philosophers (and Popper with certain reservations), who especially during 1920 — 1969 focused on logical constructions of scientific theories. It is clearly documented in the philosophy of science that these logical reconstructions, which only focused on logical relationships and omitted all non-logical contexts in the sciences, were not made for scientists’ use. They were made only for "philosophical purposes" for professional philosophers. These logical reconstructions of scientific theories — e.g., the received view of scientific theory — were later rejected for "philosophical purposes", even by the key advocates (e.g., Hempel). Alas, some influential sociologists, as well as many IS and OMR scholars, who lacked philosophical training, believe that these logical reconstructions truly present scientific theory as used by scientists. However, even key advocates of logical reconstructions (at least logical empiricists) were fully aware that their logical reconstructions, if used by scientists, would have seriously hindered scientific progress.
This misunderstanding —rejected logical reconstructions made for philosophical purposes are mistaken for real scientific theories— has the potential to seriously hinder IS research by focusing on theories as logical relationships alone and omitting the actual scientific context. Moreover, there is the need to understand scientific research beyond the rejected logical constructions (by logical empiricists). The graduate course highlights selected IS views of scientific theory, and how they are often based on philosophy of science from 1920 — 1969. Possibilities for IS theories are then explained from the perspective of modern (philosophy of) science, which followed the Received View of Scientific Theory. Modern (philosophy of) science highlights counterfactual models (rather than theories) as the main vehicles of scientific knowledge.
Speakers
Professor Mikko Siponen, who holds a D.Soc.Sc. in philosophy and Ph.D. in IS.
Chief of Medical Oncology Tuula Klaavuniemi, who holds M.Sc. in biology, Ph.D. in biochemistry, M.D. and Specialist Degree in Medical Oncology.
In this course, we explain (for example):
- How the professional philosophers’ logical reconstructions (around) 1920-1969 (partly purposefully) misunderstood actual scientific theories and how the same misunderstandings are visible in many IS theory accounts. - How many important types of scientific research (e.g., intervention or comparative research), which do not contain a “theoretical contribution”, are highly important and necessary. - How IS theory accounts may prevent the method of isolation and idealization. - Why are scientific theories typically tested in counterfactual settings (e.g., in isolated and idealized models) and not with real phenomena? - Why theory or study scopes in real settings are typically totally different than in models and how that has confused many IS authors in terms of generalizability. - Why many of the “best" scientific theories may not be generalizable to any actual settings without case by case modifications; and how IS accounts do not understand this, but require such generalizations, which even the fundamental laws of physics cannot meet. - What is explanation and prediction accuracy? - Why does an increase in study/models/theory scope (e.g., increasing explanatory breadth) typically, if not necessarily, decrease explanation or prediction accuracy in real settings? - Why are models claimed as being more important in contemporary (philosophy of) science than theories, despite this not being recognized in IS theory accounts? - Why do scientific theories/accounts purposefully and strategically mispresent the actual phenomenon? - Why do scientific theories, models and methods typically contain purposefully false assumptions (on the target phenomenon)? - Why are causal claims in sciences made in counterfactual settings (in isolated and idealized models) and not with real phenomena?
For more information, please see:
http://inforte.jyu.fi/events/reconsidering_theories
Mikko Siponen Ph.D., D.Soc.Sc. Vice Dean for Research Professor of Information Systems University of Jyväskylä Tel. +358 505588128
_______________________________________________ AISWorld mailing list AISWorld@lists.aisnet.org