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Reconsidering Theories in IS
A seminar for doctoral students and faculty
Friday November 2nd, 2018.
Perhaps it is not too much of an overstatement to say that the
expectation in top IS journals today is that every single paper
develops a new theory or modifies existing theory. In this course,
we explain how many influential and seminal IS accounts on
scientific theory profoundly obscure what is a scientific theory
in contemporary science. Moreover, generally speaking, the IS
discussion on “theory” misses the fact that the main vehicle of
scientific knowledge in the contemporary sciences are not
theories.
We note how many IS theory authors, like organizational and
management research (OMR) authors or some influential sociologists
(e.g., Robert Merton and Robert Dubin), were misled by
professional philosophers. These were namely, logical empiricist
philosophers (and Popper with certain reservations), who
especially during 1920 — 1969 focused on logical constructions of
scientific theories. It is clearly documented in the philosophy of
science that these logical reconstructions, which only focused on
logical relationships and omitted all non-logical contexts in the
sciences, were not made for scientists’ use. They were made only
for "philosophical purposes" for professional philosophers. These
logical reconstructions of scientific theories — e.g., the
received view of scientific theory — were later rejected for
"philosophical purposes", even by the key advocates (e.g.,
Hempel). Alas, some influential sociologists, as well as many IS
and OMR scholars, who lacked philosophical training, believe that
these logical reconstructions truly present scientific theory as
used by scientists. However, even key advocates of logical
reconstructions (at least logical empiricists) were fully aware
that their logical reconstructions, if used by scientists, would
have seriously hindered scientific progress.
This misunderstanding —rejected logical reconstructions made for
philosophical purposes are mistaken for real scientific theories—
has the potential to seriously hinder IS research by focusing on
theories as logical relationships alone and omitting the actual
scientific context. Moreover, there is the need to understand
scientific research beyond the rejected logical constructions (by
logical empiricists). The graduate course highlights selected IS
views of scientific theory, and how they are often based on
philosophy of science from 1920 — 1969. Possibilities for IS
theories are then explained from the perspective of modern
(philosophy of) science, which followed the Received View of
Scientific Theory. Modern (philosophy of) science highlights
counterfactual models (rather than theories) as the main vehicles
of scientific knowledge.
Speakers
Professor Mikko Siponen, who holds a D.Soc.Sc. in philosophy and
Ph.D. in IS.
Chief of Medical Oncology Tuula Klaavuniemi, who holds M.Sc. in
biology, Ph.D. in biochemistry, M.D. and Specialist Degree in
Medical Oncology.
In this course, we explain (for example):
- How the professional philosophers’ logical reconstructions
(around) 1920-1969 (partly purposefully) misunderstood actual
scientific theories and how the same misunderstandings are visible
in many IS theory accounts.
- How many important types of scientific research (e.g.,
intervention or comparative research), which do not contain a
“theoretical contribution”, are highly important and necessary.
- How IS theory accounts may prevent the method of isolation and
idealization.
- Why are scientific theories typically tested in counterfactual
settings (e.g., in isolated and idealized models) and not with
real phenomena?
- Why theory or study scopes in real settings are typically
totally different than in models and how that has confused many IS
authors in terms of generalizability.
- Why many of the “best" scientific theories may not be
generalizable to any actual settings without case by case
modifications; and how IS accounts do not understand this, but
require such generalizations, which even the fundamental laws of
physics cannot meet.
- What is explanation and prediction accuracy?
- Why does an increase in study/models/theory scope (e.g.,
increasing explanatory breadth) typically, if not necessarily,
decrease explanation or prediction accuracy in real settings?
- Why are models claimed as being more important in contemporary
(philosophy of) science than theories, despite this not being
recognized in IS theory accounts?
- Why do scientific theories/accounts purposefully and
strategically mispresent the actual phenomenon?
- Why do scientific theories, models and methods typically contain
purposefully false assumptions (on the target phenomenon)?
- Why are causal claims in sciences made in counterfactual
settings (in isolated and idealized models) and not with real
phenomena?
For more information, please see:
http://inforte.jyu.fi/events/reconsidering_theories
Mikko Siponen
Ph.D., D.Soc.Sc.
Vice Dean for Research
Professor of Information Systems
University of Jyväskylä
Tel. +358 505588128
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